

Phantoms Limn

Silvan Tomkins and Affective Prosthetics

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ABSTRACT. This article translates aspects of Freud's analysis of uncanny experiences and feelings using Silvan Tomkins' writing on the taboos on looking and phantom limb phenomenon. Centering on a poem by Emily Dickinson that has often been read in terms of the return of the repressed, the article argues that Dickinson's poem may be better understood using the idea of the sudden return or quickening of old, forgotten and overwritten visceral or kinesthetic theories. The article suggests that both Dickinson's poem and Freud's essay register peculiar experiences conditioned by photography as the graphic reproduction of facial affect, and proposes Tomkins' affect theory as a tool for better describing these media conditions.

KEY WORDS: affect, memory, perception, phantom limb phenomenon, photography, poetry, uncanny

There is a footnote in the last section of the essay "The "Uncanny"" that makes me laugh. Freud (1919/1953) has just begun in the body of the essay to distinguish 'the uncanny that we actually experience [from] the uncanny that we merely picture or read about' (p. 247), and in the footnote he gives an example from his own experience of an uncanny double. He tells a brief story of sitting alone in a compartment on a moving train and, after a violent jolt, seeing an older man in a dressing gown enter his compartment by accident:

Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass on the [suddenly] open door. I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance. (p. 248)

The footnote begins by recounting Ernst Mach's similar experience on an omnibus of forming a 'very unfavourable opinion' (as cited in Freud, 1919/1953, p. 248) about a stranger who ends up being his own mirror image, and Freud

proposes that these scenes of injured vanity may be understood less in terms of the fear or terror associated with an uncanny return of the repressed, and more in terms of the surprise and dismay of self-(mis)recognition, or what the essay calls 'reality-testing'. Considering that both men experienced these moments of misrecognition in public on moving vehicles, I wonder to what degree this essay may in some sense be about specifically modern, technologically conditioned visual experience, or, as Freud puts it at the start of the footnote, 'the effect of meeting one's own image unbidden and unexpected' (p. 248).¹

This question has come up in the context of a project on the US poet Emily Dickinson and photography, and forms part of my work that analyzes several emerging 19th-century graphic technologies through the lens of specific US writers (Frank, 2001, 2005). The graphic technologies I concentrate on (photography, telegraphy, phonography and scanning technologies) are graphic in that they are both inscriptive and violent: they involve a cut or incision that permits the indexical reproduction of face and voice at a distance, the reproduction of the primary physiological mediums of affective communication. These graphic technologies can be said to extend the reach of affect or to act as affective prosthetics. These graphic reproductions of face and voice have so often been described in the specific terms of uncanny likeness, and my primary aim in this essay is to begin to translate between the psychoanalytic terrain of the uncanny and Silvan Tomkins' affect theory, specifically his writing on the taboos on looking and phantom limb phenomena. The medium for this attempt at translation will be a poem by Emily Dickinson. I turn to Dickinson because her writing and her person have been insistently described in the most interiorizing terms, with some version of a psychoanalytic notion of repression implicitly or explicitly subtending much biographical and literary criticism of this poet. While classical psychoanalytic theory has excelled at describing the workings of disavowal, repression and other psychic defenses, it has been less successful at describing processes of avowal, skill or composition, the kind of liminal phenomena which Dickinson describes this way in a letter to her sister-in-law Sue Gilbert Dickinson: 'for the Woman whom I prefer, Here is Festival – Where my Hands are cut, Her fingers will be found inside –' (Johnson & Ward, 1958, p. 430). Tomkins' writing (1962, 1963, 1991, 1992) can assist those of us interested in thinking about the surprising, strange compositional aspects of perception, aspects which in criticism and theory of the last 30 years have tended to be folded together under the category of the uncanny.

Recall, Freud (1919/1953) refers uncanny effects to the recurrence of 'something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression' (p. 241). He draws out this theory of *unheimlich* phenomena from a reading of E.T.A. Hoffmann's 'The Sand-Man': where Jentsch (1906/1995) derives the tale's uncanny effects from the student Nathanael's and the reader's uncertainty over whether a given figure (the doll Olympia) is human or an automaton,

Freud (1919/1953) locates the primary source for the tale's uncanny effects in 'the idea of being robbed of one's eyes' (p. 230), which he understands as castration anxiety repressed and displaced upwards. He refers the uncanny effect of the tale to the return of this repressed infantile complex. As Stanley Cavell (1988) has observed, Jentsch's explanation and Freud's are not mutually exclusive: uncertainty about animacy and the idea of losing one's eyes may be understood as continuous phenomena. One way of redescribing these explanations is as follows: the Sand-Man threatens to tear out children's eyes, that is, he specifically threatens to make the child into something that can't look back, such as a doll, an automaton or a photographic portrait. Each of these gives us a figure with eyes that cannot look back, facial figures whose undecidable status – alive or dead, human or machine, present or past, real or representation – is conditioned by a failure or blockage of mutual looking. The uncanniness of dolls, embalmed corpses or photographs may be a way of describing the particular strangeness of being stared at or staring at something that has eyes but cannot look. 'I have occasionally heard a woman patient declare', writes Freud (1919/1953), 'that even at the age of eight she had still been convinced that her dolls would be certain to come to life if she were to look at them in a particular, extremely concentrated, way' (p. 233). Or again, 'One of the most uncanny and wide-spread forms of superstition is the dread of the evil eye' (p. 240).

The animating (or de-animating) quality of looking in the examples from Freud may derive from what Silvan Tomkins (1963) describes as 'the unique capacity of the look-look with respect to the expression, communication, contagion, escalation, and control of affects' (p. 158). In his chapter 'Shame–Humiliation and the Taboos on Looking' Tomkins supplements the sexual taboos that psychoanalysis has offered—on incest and homosexuality, or sex with the self-same, however that gets defined—with another set of taboos: on looking, on being looked at, and on mutual looking or interocular interaction, taboos that do not begin with or assume a notion of sameness. The evil eye, for Tomkins, is an expression of these taboos on looking and the fears associated especially with the escalation of humiliation, anger and fear. Because for Tomkins the affects act as amplifiers of the drives, including sexuality, and because the face is the organ of affect, he disagrees with the psychoanalytic insistence on 'the concept of the eye as a symbol for the penis' (p. 158), offering instead a more cybernetic analysis in which the eye acts as 'auxiliary' to other body parts, including the genitals: 'Phenomenologically the eye and the hand, or the mouth and the penis can become as fused as the fork and the hand do in eating' (Tomkins, 1963, p. 172). This cybernetic account permits him to reformulate the Oedipus myth so that the punishment fits the crime: '[Oedipus'] crime was also looking at and being seen by the mother, since the retribution is blindness. The punishment is for the ocular rather than the genital response' (p. 177). Tomkins' reformulation has implications for understanding 'the' primal scene specifically as a scene of 'looking and being

looked at when one's face and the faces of others communicate intense affect as well as sexuality' (p. 179), an emphasis on a variety of affective responses which opens out Freud's emphasis on only horror or dread. Shame becomes especially central because of its particular activator: incompletely reduced interest or enjoyment.

These varieties of individual affective responses are guided by affect theory, which Tomkins (1963) defines as 'a simplified and powerful summary of a larger set of affect experiences' (p. 230). Faced with the multidimensionality of stimuli, a theory makes figural or seeks out certain aspects of a scene. In addition to these 'cognitive antenna' of a theory, which 'examin[e] all incoming information for its relevance to a particular affect', a theory 'includes a set of strategies for coping with a variety of [, say,] shame and contempt contingencies, to avoid shame if possible or to attenuate its impact if it cannot be avoided' (pp. 319–320). Tomkins explicitly addresses such complex feedback mechanisms that comprise the relations between theory-formation and perception in the fourth volume of *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, and in his chapter on 'The Lower Senses' he offers a way of understanding, at a relatively low level of biological organization, how 'perceiving is not partly some mediate process but entirely so' (Tomkins, 1992, p. 251). Here he attempts to account for the phenomenon of phantom body parts and what this phenomenon permits awareness of, the body schema.²

The uncanniness of dolls, corpses or photographs may have more to do with a blockage of mutual looking and a set of theoretical dynamics among the animating and de-animating powers of affect than it does with the mechanism of repression as such. Freud challenges his own repression model in the last section of his essay, when he calls for an 'aesthetic enquiry' and introduces the distinction between the uncanny as it is experienced in real life and in fiction or literature. He proposes understanding the real-life uncanny as giving credence to 'primitive' or animistic beliefs in the omnipotence of thoughts or the return of the dead: rather than instances of an *unheimlich* return of repressed infantile complexes, these may be 'purely an affair of "reality-testing", a question of the material reality of the phenomena' (Freud, 1919/1953, p. 248). And following this is an important amendment to his theory:

Our conclusion could then be stated thus: an uncanny experience occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed. Finally, we must not let our predilection for smooth solutions and lucid exposition blind us to the fact that these two classes of uncanny experience are not always sharply distinguishable. (p. 249)

Freud's terms ('sharply distinguishable' categories that may 'blind' otherwise 'lucid exposition') evoke the castration anxiety he first presented in his reading of Hoffmann's tale. But the second account, in presenting an interesting

possibility for understanding some uncanny effects as the return to older, discredited rather than repressed beliefs, muddies these waters, and in the remainder of his essay Freud tries to clarify things by distinguishing between different uncannies in real life and in literature, and between the frightening and the comic. He encounters the problem, for example, of why a severed hand in one tale produces uncanny effects while in another it is only absurd or ridiculous. In what follows I will turn to severed hands to offer a way of modeling Freud's second account of the uncanny as the return of 'surmounted beliefs', although in terms more visceral than that of belief, which raises precisely the question of the material reality of the phenomena.

The New England neurologist S. Weir Mitchell coined the phrase 'phantom limbs' around 1871 and was one of the first medical practitioners to typologize different effects of phantom limb phenomenon in the wake of the large number of amputations performed during the Civil War. His first publication on the subject was an anonymous fictional case study in *Atlantic Monthly* for July 1866 called 'The Case of George Dedlow'.³ This is a gruesome quasi-philosophical meditation on personal identity told by a narrator who, over the course of his war experience, has first one arm, then both legs, then finally his remaining arm amputated. Consider an early moment in the tale when his legs are shot:

It is this moment which is so printed on my recollection. I can see it now, as if through a window, the gray smoke, lit with red flashes,—the long, wavering line,—the sky blue above,—the trodden furrows, blotted with blue blouses. Then it was as if the window closed, and I knew and saw no more. No other scene in my life is thus scarred, if I may say so, into my memory. I have a fancy that the horrible shock which suddenly fell upon me must have had something to do with thus intensifying the momentary image then before my eyes. (Mitchell, 1866, p. 4)

Here is an entirely photographic model of shock, the scene framed 'as if through a window' and the shutter released to scar the image into memory. 'I knew and saw no more': within the analogy to photographic apparatus, consciousness, knowledge and vision are collapsed onto blind inscription of what would now be called a traumatic event. Note the *nachträglich* temporality that accompanies this photographic metaphor, as the metaphor is instituted both now ('I can see it now, as if through a window') and then ('Then it was as if the window closed'), retrospectively framing and recasting the past in photographic terms.

I will return to this circular temporality as it in part constitutes the phenomenon of phantom limbs. But consider first the reappearance of the photographic metaphor at another crucial moment in the tale. The narrator has found that only one person understands what he describes as his lessened 'sense of his own existence' due to his various amputations, a New England lady who explains matters this way:

Life ... is the garnered condensation of objective impressions; and as the objective is the remote father of the subjective, so must individuality, which is but focused subjectivity, suffer and fade when the sensation lenses, by which rays of impression are condensed, become destroyed. (Mitchell, 1866, p. 8)

In this burlesque of Transcendental philosophy the individual becomes both a camera and a photograph: sensation lenses transmit and focus objective 'rays of impression' onto or as subjective individuality, implicitly analogized to light-sensitive photographic prints which can 'fade'. In two moments in this story the writer presents analogies to elements of photographic apparatus, analogies to both camera and photograph. But why photography? What precisely is the relation between phantom limbs and photography? Both phantoms and photographs offer us the presence of something absent, a simultaneous presence and absence often posed in terms of haunting returns: consider the tale's gothic ending, in which the narrator participates in a séance at which he finds himself staggering across the room, supported by the invisible ghosts of his summoned legs. The last sentence of the tale links this sensationalized gothic with its flip-side, the sentimentalizing hope for a better future: 'It is needless to add, that I am not a happy fraction of a man; and that I am eager for the day when I shall rejoin the lost members of my corporeal family in another and a happier world' (Mitchell, 1866, p. 11). These puns ('needless to add', 'lost members') point to the literalness of amputation for thinking about sentimental concerns of preservation, attachment and loss, or, most generally, separation. And Mitchell's puns may be understood as attempts to manage this anxiety. But 'separation anxiety' does not adequately describe the varieties of terror, exhilaration and surprise that comprise what may be funny as well as frightening in these uncanny returns. And if photography may model the kind of preservation in phantom limb phenomenon, it is equally true that phantom limb phenomenon can model the phenomena of photography.

To address these questions of the relations between amputation and subsequent phantom limbs, photography and this field of the uncanny, I want to turn to what is probably Emily Dickinson's most famous ghost poem. Its fame stems from the fact that it seems so obviously to be about the return of the repressed.⁴

One need not be a Chamber – to be Haunted –
 One need not be a House –
 The Brain – has Corridors surpassing
 Material Place –

 Far safer of a Midnight – meeting
 External Ghost –
 Than an Interior – confronting –
 That cooler – Host –

Far safer, through an Abbey – gallop –
 The Stones a'chase –
 Than Moonless – One's A'self encounter –
 In lonesome place –

Oursel – behind Oursel – Concealed –
 Should startle – most –
 Assassin – hid in our Apartment –
 Be Horror's least –

The Prudent – carries a Revolver –
 He bolts the Door –
 O'erlooking a Superior Spectre –
 More near –

As Robert Weisbuch (1975) puts it, 'This parody of a cheap gothic ballad attempts to rescue Burkean sublimity from the genteel shudder' (p. 83). If it succeeds, it does so by parodying specifically the gothic relations of containment and rupture as they fail adequately to represent a kind of return or becoming-proximate of something ('a Superior Spectre') that is uncanny precisely in being both familiar and strange, 'Oursel – behind Oursel'. This poem plays with sensationalist terror and an indeterminacy of inside and outside, and its subject is a masculine 'Prudent' (or, as one of Dickinson's variant words has it, a 'Body'). Each stanza offers a conventional gothic scene (a haunted house, an abbey chase) to suggest that this scene fails adequately to represent the quality in question. The poem gives us progressively more interiorizing gothic scenes, and, through a repeating practice of 'negative definition', attempts to evoke the distance between the interiority occasioned by such conventional images and some other, more sublime proximity that may not best be represented by such tropes of interiority.⁵

Indeed, this sublimity may not best be represented at all, at least not visually. To begin to approach this quality, consider another form of negative definition in this poem, its primary rhythmic or kinesthetic technique for achieving a more than genteel shudder. While the second and fourth lines of each stanza have two feet, the final line of the poem breaks the meter and has only one. It is missing a final foot, a missing metrical foot that is still there in one of the variant lines ('He fails to fear'), though this is never chosen to end any of the published versions of the poem that I have seen. This missing foot trips up a reader the way expecting one more stair where there is none can make one stumble. This missing metrical foot may be understood in the quite visceral terms of surgery, amputation and consequent phantom limbs. Note that there are several such puns that make use of poetic materials, the actual letters and lines: for example, the word 'Ghost' contains its rhyme 'host', and implies the more characteristic Dickinson half-rhyme 'guest'. Or consider the line divisions of the fascicle version of the poem, for example the separation of 'Apart -/ment -', and also the word 'surpassing', which itself literally surpasses the phrase 'Material Place' on

the page. Dickinson's literalizing inscriptions of divisibility and containment create a mock gothic that parodies in advance those readings that moralize the value of paying attention to 'the hidden self'; such a self is fractionalized by line divisions, proliferating variants and alternate final lines, all of which emphasize material, structured relations of part to part (the 'Corridors' of 'The Brain') rather than the simple, hollow and closed space of a chamber or the unifying relation of family identity that may govern a house. Gothic interiority, then, is evoked and specified as too simplistic a model for the more intricate mind-body relations that this poem proposes.

In Mitchell's 'The Case of George Dedlow' (1866) a gothic chamber or haunted house model grounds an explanation for the sudden return of the feeling of an absent limb:

... the nerve is like a bell-wire. You may pull it at any part of its course, and thus ring the bell as if you pulled at the end of the wire; but, in any case, the intelligent servant will refer the pull to the front door, and obey it accordingly. (p. 6)

This explanation is a slightly embellished form of René Descartes' in *Meditations on First Philosophy*, the classic modern statement of the philosophical problem that dreams and hallucinations pose for foundational knowledge and the oppositions of internal to external and mind to body. Descartes (1641/1979) brings forward the phenomenon in a famous paragraph on 'the very great difference between a mind and a body' (p. 53), in which he imagines that losing limbs would not subtract from his mind. But after producing a theory of hallucinated pain to explain phantom limbs, he goes on to conclude the *Meditations* by withdrawing from his quest for grounds for certainty, very briefly proposing a pragmatic epistemology which relies on the action of memory in waking life: in the face of 'the need to get things done' (p. 56) he recommends accepting our vulnerability to error and the capacity of all our senses, in combination with memory and intellect, to get things right most of the time. Strangely, it is as if his ability to produce an explanation of the phenomenon of what would come to be called phantom limbs enables Descartes' turn from certainty to trial and error, as if the complexity occasioned by phantom limb phenomenon's confusion between perceiving the (external) world and remembering or recalling (internal) images brings up too many problems for his foundationalist enterprise. These problems come to take center stage in the German phenomenology of the 1870s (e.g. in the writing of Franz Brentano [as cited in Chisholm, 1960], an important teacher for Freud), and phantom limb phenomenon appears as a limit case for the basic problem of perception: is perception perception of inner or outer, mental or physical phenomena, presentation or representation?

The phenomenon of phantoms requires a finer-grained and more reciprocal account of the relations between perception and memory than that available in dualist philosophy; some more contemporary accounts begin to understand

how body parts can be agentive as well as passive. For Tomkins (1992; as well as for Joel Katz), phantoms exist because of a history in which there has been extensive external and internal stimulation. They arise from a reciprocal relation between center and periphery (Katz, 1993) and a variety of inputs that are especially kinesthetic and vestibular and include sensations of motion, temperature, tactility and texture. In a chapter on 'The Lower Senses', Tomkins (1992) writes that 'Vision ... is an intermittent source of stimulation for the maintenance of the body image because what is figural in vision is rarely one's own body' (p. 256). Think of the role of vision in playing a musical instrument: it is much more important when you begin to learn a piece, but later becomes more of a check on what are primarily learned motions and rhythms. The feedback relation between center and periphery creates phantoms which exist, as Tomkins writes:

... not simply because there has been a great deal of past experience with the limb, although it has in fact been touched, seen, and given pain to on numerous occasions, but rather because there has been voluminous, continuous stimulation from the inner receptors both preceding and following purposive action with the limbs. (p. 257)

It is because body parts (including the face) are, in this sense, skilled that phantoms are 'never destroyed' but can get overwritten by 'newer and newer versions' (p. 259). Phantom limbs may transform and even disappear, but are still always liable to be recalled in 'sudden emergencies': 'if a patient trips over an obstacle, he may reach out for support with his phantom hand' (p. 244). This sudden reemergence of old skills may take place because of familiarity, a resemblance of a current scene or person to a past one: 'the sight of another amputee, a reminder of the original accident, or even a dream is capable of restoring the phantom' (p. 250). Such triggering of older phantoms would be one way of describing the experience of quickening, a sudden reemergence of old skills or habits, what Freud calls surmounted beliefs, or, better, surmounted practices and theories.

Dickinson's poem depicts a similar kind of sudden (re)appearance and the limits of visual mechanisms for controlling the fear associated with this new old presence. In the fair copy Dickinson sent to Sue in the beginning of 1864 (Franklin, 1998, p. 431), she changed 'Moonless' to 'unarmed' in line 11: 'Than unarmed, one's a self encounter.' As well the final stanza is different:

The Body – borrows a Revolver –
 He bolts the door –
 O'erlooking a superior spectre –
 Or More –

The body's borrowed revolver (arm or wheel) is useless in attempts to secure inside from outside, to fix the opposition on the ground of gothic visuality. We

can understand the spectre's plural proximity, and the literalization of this plurality in the variant final lines, in terms of how phantoms overwrite one another ('Maintaining a superior spectre'). 'O'erlooking', in this last stanza, may mean both supervision and forgetting of a history of bodily motions, behaviors, feelings and skills, that which is overlooked in visual representations that abstract this temporality from bodies. 'One need not be a Chamber', then, may be translated as one need not be a camera, for the poem proposes the failure of a model of the camera as an instrument (a 'revolver') that supervises the alignment of inside and outside, the failure of instruments of vision to control the fear associated with sudden returns, whether returns of beliefs, habits, skills, loves, persons or parts of persons. Dickinson forwards and negates the analogy to photographic apparatus: consider how the variant for line eight, 'That Whiter Host', may be the specific 'host' of the photographic portrait, the albumen paper on which prints were made (albumen from *albus* white, the white of an egg). That this host should be 'interior' to the 'external ghost' revises the gothic relations of containment or the separation of inside and outside that photographic looking reformulated.

Consider Roland Barthes' (1981) counter-intuitive writing on the (pre-digital) photograph as a temporal hallucination:

Now, in the Photograph, what I posit is not only the absence of the object; it is also, by one and the same movement, on equal terms, the fact that this object has indeed existed and that it has been there where I see it. Here is where madness is, for until this day no representation could assure me of the past of a thing except by intermediaries; but with the Photograph, my certainty is immediate: no one in the world can deceive me. The Photograph then becomes a bizarre *medium*, a new form of hallucination: false on the level of perception, true on the level of time: a temporal hallucination ... a mad image, chafed by reality. (p. 115)

This is precisely what a phantom is: the certain presence of something that is no longer there, felt rather than seen. Both index what was once there, and both are triggered or conditioned by a kind of cut, an amputation or shutter release. But they occupy different primary sensory registers: a phantom is a kinesthetic and vestibular (but invisible) trace, while a photograph is a visible one. And where photographs have been ideologized under the banner of realism as documenting truth, phantoms have been dismissed under the same banner as representations, hallucinations or fictions. These valuations follow from a privileging of vision, and Dickinson's writing here explores the limits of this privileging; elsewhere, her writing turns toward senses other than vision to understand memory's role in perception.

Instead of thinking of phantoms as phenomena that need to be explained away because of the threat they pose to the primacy granted to vision, this analysis aims to make room for considering phantoms as themselves agents of explanation. A phantom is a theory of a (particular part of a) body, a nervy

guess as to where the body (part) is at a given moment, and an image or ideal to aim at. Phantoms image specific bodily postures and attitudes; they are both what you learn when you become skilled at a given action or practice and how you learn it—a feedback loop conditioned by repeated trial and error. As vestibular and kinesthetic theories of bodies that augment other theories, phantoms both limn or misrecognize bodies and guide their negotiations, and always in relation to some scene or environment. They may be underwritten and reemphasized, or rewritten or changed in some way, or entirely overwritten and forgotten (for the moment) by a particularly powerful scene.⁶ As Tomkins (1962) writes, ghoulishly:

If it were possible to amputate the face and for the subject to continue to live, we would predict a phantom face of much greater longevity and resistance to deformation and extinction than in the case of phantom limbs following amputation. (p. 208)

Photographs, understood as just such facial amputations, may also be understood as theories. Perhaps this is what we mean when we say that a given photograph is a good picture of someone, that it captures something about that person: less that it is a good likeness and more that it's a workable theory of some aspect of someone.

With Freud's notion of *Nachträglichkeit* and Tomkins' notion of posticipation (see Tomkins, 1963, pp. 67–68), the reciprocal relations between memory and perception are brought forward in time: 'experiences, impressions, and memory-traces may be revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development' (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 111). The phenomenon of phantoms poses an extreme and vivid example of the presentness of memory-traces and how they are susceptible to transformation or revision with new experiences or conditions (although this newness must also be understood provisionally). Phantoms make palpable the materiality of fantasy, and vice versa: how our irreducibly indexical, reciprocal relations to the world are theoretical, phantasmatic ones that are structured by (and owe their existence to) a history of negotiations between (a given material and formal) system and (aspects of a plural and fractional) environment. These system–environment relations, these figurations or theories, are kinesthetic, vestibular and affective as well as visual and linguistic. They are also analogical (at such low levels of organization), about a goal or purpose, perhaps conscious but probably not. I suggest here that the powerful, near-irresistible sense readers have that Dickinson's poems perpetually interiorize their objects comes from an incisive analogizing or mapping of the psycho-soma, of kinesthetic, vestibular, auditory and visual sensations through rhythm, rhyme, orthography and ellipsis. This is a way of saying that her writing is 'embodied', but, more than that, of opening out this sense of bodiliness onto terms that differentiate more than just between oppositions of mind and body, inside and outside, or psychic and material; these are all useful distinctions as long as they

are not reified, as inside/outside or conscious/unconscious are when posed solely in terms of vision. I have found Tomkins' writing to offer rich resources for de-reifying these distinctions and making them more open one to the other.

Notes

1. Friedrich Kittler (1997) reads this footnote along these lines as indexing a particular historical shift away from print and toward film as the primary storage medium. While most approaches to Freud's essay in the 1970s and 1980s (see especially Cixous, 1976; Derrida, 1981; Hertz, 1985) center on fiction and literary representation, Kittler's reading is one of several more recent treatments that centers on film and the relations between and across media.
2. Tomkins does not distinguish between body schema and body image. For a clarification of this distinction, see Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996).
3. For a comparative discussion of Mitchell's short story and his more scientific account, see Journet (1990).
4. This transcription of the poem foregrounds the quatrain structure in order to highlight the meter. A more complex transcription of the poem appears as number 407 in R.W. Franklin's edition of Dickinson's poetry (Franklin, 1998). Franklin's edition offers the poem as Dickinson copied it onto a sheet of stationery and bound it into a pamphlet or fascicle (in the autumn of 1862), and includes the variant words and phrases as well as Dickinson's line divisions. I make reference to some of these variants and line divisions in my reading of the poem, and therefore give Franklin's complex notations for these here. The numbers refer to the poem's line numbers.

Variant words and phrases:

4 Material] Corporeal 8] That Whiter Host.
 17 The Prudent] The Body 17 a] the
 19–20] A Spectre – infinite – accom –
 panying – He fails to fear –
 Maintaining a superior spectre –
 None saw –

Line division:

1 chamber –| 3 Corridors| 5 Midnight –|
 9 Abbey – | 11 A'self| 12 place – || 13 behind Ourselves – |15 Apartment]
 Apart – lment

5. Cristanne Miller (1987) describes Dickinson's practice of negative definition this way: '[She] uses her whole poem as a name or definition; the poem fills the hole it creates by outlining the boundaries that no word has yet been designed to fill' (p. 99).
6. This description of phantoms also describes what Tomkins calls scripts, which revises his earlier notion of theory. For a discussion of Tomkins' notion of theory, see Sedgwick and Frank (1995).

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